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This article considers the relationship between liberty and security, proposing 
a balancing approach to make adjudications when they conflict. The theoret-
ical framework is developed in § 1, then applied in § 2 to the USA PATRIOT 
Act and aviation security, two archetypical post-9/11 restrictions on liberty for 
the sake of security. To understand whether restrictions on liberties can be 
justified, the costs of security—or its absence—must be understood; this 
discussion is offered in § 3, with a focus on the costs of terrorism and counter-
terrorism. § 4 uses these results to argue against critics of the balancing 
approach, most notably Jeremy Waldron. 
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I. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Liberty and security stand in tension with each other.1 There are at 
least some liberties that, if retained—or conferred—will lessen security.2 
This conceptual claim need not be committed to any particular conception as 
to which liberties those are, and it certainly does not follow that all liberties 
bear some relationship to security. To be sure, they do not, which is to say 
that many liberties gain no purchase at all on the security debate. But granting 
that at least some do, the tension appears: should—or do3—we prefer more 
liberties or more security? 
This is an incredibly difficult question to answer, though there are at 
least several broad approaches that might be undertaken. On the one hand, 
we might think that liberties are more important than security; it is better to 
be free than to be safe. On the other, we might think that security is more 
important than liberty; it is better to be safe than to be free. But are these real 
answers to the question? Or are they just platitudinous rhetoric? 
Neither end of this spectrum portends much plausibility. If we were fully 
free, we would also be perpetually at risk since unconstrained liberties could be 
nefariously deployed. This sort of Hobbesian state of nature motivates our 
departure into civil society and the associated restrictions on our liberties.4 Lest 
the pendulum swing too far in the other direction, a police state threatens. Under 
																																								 																				
1 See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007) (acknowledging the trade-off between security and liberty, but 
arguing that deference should be given to the executive branch in adjusting the security policy 
during times of emergency). See also John Kleinig, Liberty and Security in an Era of Terrorism, 
in CRIMINOLOGISTS ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY, 357-82 (Brian Forst, Jack R. 
Greene & James P. Lynch eds., 2011) (examining the issue regarding the appropriate balance 
between liberty and security during times of increased threat to national security). Though 
terrorism presents a compelling context in which to consider this issue, it has been suggested in 
other contexts and eras as well. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
(finding the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II constitutional). See also 
Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (1951) (high-
lighting the tension between liberty and security resulting from wartime stresses in U.S. history). 
This was a lecture given by former Supreme Court Justice Jackson to the Buffalo Law School. 
2 I will not have much to say about what liberty and security are, which is certainly important. In 
this regard, Kleinig, supra note 1, is useful; I agree with his characterizations of both concepts. 
3 While my project is more normative than descriptive, there is important empirical data on 
the latter. See Carol W. Lewis, The Clash between Security and Liberty in the U.S. Response 
to Terror, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 18, 18-30 (2005) (examining the public’s opinion on the 
tradeoff between security and liberty before and after 9/11). 
4 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN XII.9 (A.P. Martinich & Brian Battiste eds., Broadview 
Press 2010). See also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 6 (1986) 
(discussing the implications of a state where everyone has the power to enforce the law). 




this totalitarian regime, we may well be secure, but toward what end?5 If security 
comes at too high a price, we might well reject the offer. 
Without luck on the extremes, a more moderate approach looks 
attractive. On such an approach, liberty and security both matter, and the aim is 
to strike an adequate balance between the two.6 While this approach is not 
without detractors—several of whom will be considered in § 4—it serves as a 
useful starting point. Here we acknowledge the tension between liberty and 
security, without taking a dogmatic approach as to which takes priority in 
individual cases. Rather, there will be interplay between the two where we 
will—whether judiciously or liberally—restrict liberties for the sake of security. 
Still, there are at least two substantial preliminary problems. First, the 
project now becomes at least partially empirical insofar as it starts to matter 
whether any particular restriction on liberty improves security.7 On this tack, the 
civil libertarian could avoid value judgments altogether by successfully arguing 
that some curtailment of liberties just does not matter for our security. There 
would still be the issue of whether people are safer or whether they feel safer; 
pending the discussion in § 4, the appropriate metric has not been fixed either 
way. But conceding that some restriction does not make people safer and that 
promulgation of this fact precludes them from feeling safer—which surely will 
not always be true—the restriction would not be offset by any compensatory 
benefit. In such a case, there would be no reason to sustain it. 
While more will be said about this problem later, it can somewhat be 
cabined for the purposes of the theoretical project. Still, that theoretical project 
borders on the irrelevant without any sort of practical upshot, so some 
engagement is owed. The principal dialectical move is to simply deny that any 
liberty restriction we would seriously countenance has no implications for 
security; else, why affect it? Surely the critic can charitably allow that the restric-
tion has some implications for security, the issue then becoming how much. And 
once we have gotten this far, the first problem transposes into the second.  
That second problem becomes one of commensurability, under which 
liberty and security need to be represented in some common currency.8 This 
																																								 																				
5 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
6 In addition to striking a balance between these values, we may also want to find balance between 
the modes of political enforcement. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Balancing Privacy 
and Security in an Age of Terror, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 607, 607-19 (2004) (“[D]escribing what the 
technologies and legal arrangements might look like if they were modified to achieve this balance 
between privacy and security; and . . . who is most likely to guarantee this effective balance.”). 
7 Lewis, supra note 3, at 23. 
8 The problem of commensurability and value is an old one. See HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METH-
ODS OF ETHICS (1907) (exploring methods for making value choices and the required assumption 
that pleasures and pains are commensurable). While present purposes do not require a technical 




problem is even worse than it appears, because it requires not only that liberty 
and security are commensurable, but also that either can be measured at all. So 
even if we could say that x units of security were worth y units of liberty, we 
would have to be able to say what those respective units were in the first place. 
In other words, imagine that some restriction of liberty has some upshot in terms 
of security; is it worth it? To answer that question, we would obviously want to 
know how much security we were getting for how much liberty restriction, and 
this apparently requires both: (1) that we quantify each; and (2) in common 
terms. Either of these requirements seems daunting, if not insurmountable. The 
way forward is to trade precision for heuristic. As an analogy, consider the weight 
of a rhinoceros versus the weight of a grand piano: we do not need to know the 
weight of either to know that the rhinoceros weighs more.9 This example gets us 
past (1) insofar as we can make comparisons without knowing quantities. But 
we are still left with (2) as the example presumes a common currency (viz., 
weight) that is inapplicable to comparisons between liberty and security. 
Still, we do make adjudicative policy decisions all the time, apparently 
across disparate considerations. If, for example, a gun control bill fails to clear 
Congress, there is some straightforward sense in which we, as a polity, fail to 
ratify the restriction on liberty that would have conferred added security.10 To be 
sure, there are distortional effects in an example like this (e.g., disproportionate 
lobbying power), but that just makes the point: if there were sufficient political 
will, then the legislation would get through. Obviously this process generalizes 
beyond the liberty/security context. Whether we think about decisions to go to 
war, to offer farm subsidies, to institute performance-based evaluations in public 
schools, or any other complex policy decision, a wide range of apparently 
incommensurable values are put in conflict. That we do adjudicate those 
conflicts shows that we can, even if it does not elucidate how.11 
																																								 																				
conception of commensurability, this suffices: “[t]wo items are commensurable if and only if 
there is some single norm such that consideration for and against choosing each item may be 
adequately arrayed prior to the choice (for purposes of deliberation” simply in terms of the greater 
or lesser satisfaction of the single norm.” Henry S. Richardson, Commensurability as a Prereq-
uisite of Rational Choice: An Examination of Sidgwick’s Position, 8 HIST. OF PHIL. Q. 181 (1991).  
9 In an informal poll I conducted among my colleagues and students, ninety-one percent of 
those asked got the answer right, but their answers on relative weights varied by 6,000% (n = 
11). The average rhinoceros weighs two or three times as much as the average grand piano.  
10 See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, Gun Background Check, Assault Weapon Compromise Fail in Senate, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/04/ 
17/senate-to-vote-on-amendments-to-gun-bill-with-background-check-plan-in-doubt (explaini-
ng that proposal to expand the national gun background system lacked the votes required to pass). 
11 See Richard F. Elmore, Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy 
Decisions, 94 POL. SCI. Q. 601, 601-16 (1979) (discussing forward mapping and backward 
mapping approaches to implementation analysis).  




The fact that there is partisan disagreement over some of these issues 
complicates things issue, though not irretrievably so.12 To return to our 
example, suppose that there are two reasonable views one could take about 
gun control. One of these sides will prevail, while the other will not; there 
either will, or will not, be background checks, magazine restrictions, and so 
on. This does not preclude that there could be compromise within or across 
the relevant parameters, but rather only presupposes that at least some 
reasonable people will be unhappy with the eventual outcome. There are two 
possible explanations here. First, people could simply ascribe different values 
to those outcomes; in other words, they just fundamentally disagree about 
what a good outcome would look like.13 Second, their commitments might be 
sufficiently coarse so as to render any particular outcome indeterminate. In 
other words, those commitments might have enough imprecision that the 
disagreement is effectively spurious; it reflects, not a failure of ultimate 
agreement, but rather of epistemic resolution and articulation.14  
Whether the disagreement is thoroughgoing or provisional, it need not 
derail our attempt at commensurability. In either case, the inter-personal tension 
is substantively akin to the intra-personal one, which is to say that competing 
values that some particular individual has are ultimately adjudicated when she 
expresses her considered policy preference. The inter-personal tension is 
similarly adjudicated when society ultimately speaks—i.e., when it adopts some 
particular policy—since, as a first approximation, it has internalized the intra-
personal values of its constituents. 
This section has been admittedly abstract, so it will be useful to 
recapitulate the key ideas before moving on. In thinking through the tension 
between liberty and security, neither takes absolute preeminence over the 
other. Rather, there is a trade-off between the two under which some 
augmentation of security is worth some restriction on liberty.15 This highly 
formalistic answer takes no substantive position on how much of one is worth 
																																								 																				
12 See AMY GUTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT: WHY MORAL 
CONFLICT CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN POLITICS, AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1996) 
(reflecting on the implications of political disagreement and proposing ways to address it). See 
also Charles Larmore, Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 61 
(1994) (recognizing an inevitable disagreement about the nature of the good life).  
13 John Doris & Alexandra Plakias, How to Argue about Disagreement: Evaluative Diversity 
and Moral Realism, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY: 
INTUITION AND DIVERSITY, 303 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008). See also Sarah 
McGrath, Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise, 3 OXFORD STUD. IN METAETHICS 87 
(2008) (examining to what extent does moral disagreement undermine moral knowledge). 
14 Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 215-40 (1987).  
15 Kleinig, supra note 1, at 377-79. 
 




how much of the other; the commitment is simply that the two are commen-
surable, at least heuristically if not quantitatively.16 Moving forward, the 
discussion will be concretized by considering particular ways in which 
liberties and security interact. 
 
II. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK 
 
In will be useful to see how, in practice, the tension between liberties 
and security is manifest. The hope is that we can gain greater purchase on the 
theoretical discussion by exemplifying it. Furthermore, § 4 will consider 
criticisms of the view that I defend, and those criticisms come both at the 
theoretical and practical levels. By presenting a practical discussion to 
complement the theoretical one, both a fuller picture will be developed and 
more critical work will be able to be incorporated. To put it another way, the 
theoretical and practical discussions take parallel tracks, yet both tracks head 
in the same direction vis-à-vis ultimate conclusions. This section therefore 
presents another dimension of the framework—viz., its application—and will 
be useful moving forward. 
While there is a range of examples that illustrate the tension between 
liberty and security, the focus here will be on just two: the USA PATRIOT 
Act and aviation security. In many ways, these are the most visible of our 
responses to terrorism, and their implications the most widely discussed. 
They are also both highly politicized, with passionate supporters and 
detractors. Furthermore, there are—or least let us charitably suppose—
reasonable views on both sides of the debate. By exploring the associated 
contours, we can gain a clearer focus on the more general project. 
That said, nothing in particular hangs on either of the two examples. 
Per above, it will be useful to have some specific examples on the table, but 
it matters not so much what the examples are. The ones I am presenting here 
are tied to the terrorism context, which is on purpose: terrorism and 
counterterrorism constitute the interface at which the tension between liberty 
and security is most pronounced. And, in the public conscience, this context 
is the one in which that tension is most viscerally felt. The overall discussion, 
though, generalizes beyond terrorism. 
For example, as already mentioned, gun control is another context in 
which liberty is pitted against security. As it stands, we have various liberties 
with regards to guns (e.g., to purchase them without background checks at 
																																								 																				
16 See Hillel Steiner, How Free?: Computing Personal Liberty, in OF LIBERTY, 73-90 (A. 
Philips Griffiths ed., Cambridge University Press, 1983) (elaborating on the difficulties of 
quantifying liberties). 




gun shows, to load them with high-capacity magazines, to deploy them with 
certain firing rates, etc.). Particularly in the aftermath of school shootings, 
many—predominantly, but not exclusively liberals17—think that these 
liberties should be curtailed under the aegis of increased security, whether for 
the benefit of schoolchildren or for society at large. This debate is therefore 
isomorphic to the ones that we will consider with regards to the USA 
PATRIOT Act and aviation security, the only difference being that it does 
not (directly) relate to terrorism.18 At any rate, this is a minor disclaimer that 
need not detract from the central argument. 
 
A. USA PATRIOT Act 
 
The USA PATRIOT Act19 was signed into law by President Bush 
within two months of 9/11; it was a direct response to those terrorist acts.20 
The title of the legislation is important, even if it goes unnoticed, or is 
misunderstood. USA PATRIOT Act is an acronym that stands for “Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.” Of course, many of us know this, but the 
general public almost certainly thinks that “USA” stands for “United States 
of America” and that “patriot” is part of the title, not an implicated metaphor; 
neither presumption is true. But why does the title matter? For present 
purposes, the answer is that the title straightforwardly ties to liberty and 
security, specifically by empowering law enforcement with tools to stop 
terrorism. Those tools obviously confer security, but at the cost of liberties. 
While a complete discussion of the Act’s provisions is unnecessary for 
present purposes, some of those provisions are worth highlighting.21 Many of 
																																								 																				
17 Larry Alan Burns, A Conservative Case for an Assault Weapons Ban, L.A. TIMES, (Dec. 20, 
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/20/opinion/la-oe-burns-assault-weapons-ban-201212 
20. Judge Burns is the Republican-appointed judge who oversaw the trial and sentencing of Jared 
Lee Loughner—Loughner perpetrated a mass shooting in Tucson, Arizona in 2011, killing six 
people and injuring U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords and federal judge John Roll. 
18 Of course it might relate indirectly insofar as gun control has implications for the guns to which 
terrorists have access, but terrorism is not the primary context in which gun control is presented. 
19 H.R. 3162, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
20 See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Reclaiming Patriotism: A Call to Reconsider 
the Patriot Act 1, 5 (2009) [hereinafter ACLU] (identifying the Patriot Act provisions “that 
require intensive oversight and modification to prevent abuse”). 
21 For more discussion, see Fritz Allhoff, The War on Terror and the Ethics of Exception-
alism, 8 J. OF MIL. ETHICS 265, 265-88 (2009) (explaining that the USA PATRIOT Act 
contained various “sunset provisions” that were set to expire in 2005; however, these were 
made permanent by Congress). 
 




them were originally set to expire in 2005,22 though were subsequently 
renewed.23 Ultimately, the legislation increases the surveillance power of the 
government, and in controversial ways. The most important new surveillance 
powers are these: 
 
(1) the ability to conduct surveillance on a particular target 
regardless of the specific communications provider and 
facility the target uses [i.e., the “roving wiretap”; § 206] . . . ; 
(2) the ability to conduct surveillance on non-U.S. persons 
who are not affiliated with any known terrorist organizations 
[i.e., “lone wolf” terrorists; § 207] . . . ; and (3) the ability to 
obtain a court order (provided certain conditions are met) for 
any tangible item, including documents [i.e., the “library 
records” provision; § 215] . . . .24 
																																								 																				
22 For the complete list, see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32186, USA 
PATRIOT ACT: SUNSET PROVISIONS THAT EXPIRE ON DECEMBER 31, 2005 (2004). The list 
includes: § 201 (wiretapping in terrorism cases); §202 (wiretapping in computer fraud and 
abuse felony cases); § 203(b) (sharing wiretap information); §203(d) (sharing foreign 
intelligence information); § 204 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) pen 
register/trap and trace exceptions); § 206 (roving FISA wiretaps); § 207 (duration of FISA 
surveillance of non-US persons who are agents of a foreign power); § 209 (seizure of voice-
mail messages pursuant to warrants); § 212 (emergency disclosure of electronic surveil-
lance); § 214 (FISA pen register/trap and trace authority); §215 (FISA access to tangible 
items); § 217 (interception of computer trespasser communications); §218 (purpose for FISA 
orders); §220 (nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence); § 223 (civil 
liability and discipline for privacy violations); and § 225 (provider immunity for FISA 
wiretap assistance. Id. (adapted from Jonathan Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 = ?: What Counts 
in Counterterrorism, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 121 (2006)). 
23 The USA PATRIOT Act was renewed and amended through three subsequent pieces of 
legislation. The first piece of legislation was the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthor-
ization Act of 2005. USA Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). The second piece of legislation was the USA PATRIOT Act 
Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006. USA PATRIOT Act Additional 
Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-178, 120 Stat. 278 (2006). For 
analysis of this piece of legislation, see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RS22216, USA PATRIOT ACT REAUTHORIZATION IN BRIEF (2005). The third piece of 
legislation was PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011. PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act 
of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-114, 125 Stat. 216 (2011). See EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R40138, AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) 
EXTENDED UNTIL JUNE 1, 2015 (2011) (discussing the extension of the three amendments 
and their respective expansion of federal intelligence-gathering authorities’ scope). 
24 Philip M. Bridwell & Jamil N. Jaffer, Updating the Counterterrorism Toolkit: A Brief Sampling 
of Post-9/11 Surveillance Laws and Authorities, in THE LAW OF COUNTERTERRORISM 232 (Lynne 
K. Zusman ed., 2012). For a more comprehensive—if bombastic and heavy-handed—discussion, 
see John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for “Homeland 




Each of these provisions restricts certain liberties, most generally liberties 
against being surveilled. Still, it will be useful to look at them individually. 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is amended by § 
206, which allows for roving wiretaps. The amended legislation weakens 
privacy protections since surveillance orders no longer require the specifi-
cation of a particular location, phone number, or internet account, nor do they 
require the identification of a particular target.25 While FISA had typically 
required that a surveillance target be affiliated with a foreign power (e.g., a 
foreign government or foreign terrorist organization), § 207 makes possible 
the surveillance of “lone wolf” terrorists, namely terrorists without an 
established connection to a foreign power. A motivation for this provision 
was that, prior to 9/11, the FBI could not tie Zacarias Moussaoui to a foreign 
terrorist organization and therefore was unable to examine his laptop; § 207 
would have made such an examination possible.26 
Prior to 9/11, FISA allowed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC) to issue orders requiring third parties to supply business records 
of suspected terrorists, pursuant to a government investigation. However, 
requests could only be served upon four types of entities: common carriers 
(e.g., airlines and bus companies); establishments of public accommodation 
(e.g., hotels); storage locker facilities; and vehicle rental agencies.27 Under § 
215, however, the FISA business records provision was amended in three 
principal ways. First, the supplying entities no longer had to fall into one of 
the aforementioned categories. Second, “business records” was replaced with 
“any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other 
items);” this substantially expands the scope of materials that can be 
requested. Third, § 215 eliminates the requirement that the government show 
the person against whom materials are requested is a foreign power or agent 
of foreign power. Rather, the government only need to certify that the records 
are germane to a national security investigation.28 
These provisions compromise liberties in straightforward ways. 
Under § 206, an individual can be surveilled without previously-required 
																																								 																				
Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department’s Anti-
Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1079, 1079-1133 (2002) (“[W]hile Congress’ anti-
terrorism law, the so-called Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (‘Patriot Act’) may not have been designed to 
restrict American citizens’ civil liberties, its unintended consequences threaten the fundamental 
constitutional rights of people who have absolutely no involvement with terrorism.”). 
25 Bridwell & Jaffer, supra note 24, at 239-40.  
26 Two restrictions on § 207 are worth noting, namely that it cannot be exercised against 
Americans or permanent residents and that it only applies to “international terrorism.”  
27 Bridwell & Jaffer, supra note 24, at 241. 
28 Id. 




government specifications, which is to say that more surveillance is possible 
and that liberty against that surveillance is therefore curtailed. To put it 
another way, the government may surveil individuals post-§ 206 that it could 
not surveil pre-§ 206, whether because certain conditions that would have 
prevented their surveillance no longer immunize them (e.g., failure to name 
the individual, location, phone number, or internet account). The lone-wolf 
allowance of § 207 also expands the number of people that can be surveilled; 
non-affiliation with a foreign power is no longer sufficient for immunity. 
Furthermore, § 215 expands the sorts of materials that can be surveilled, 
which means that liberties that individuals had vis-à-vis “any tangible 
thing[s]” that were not “business records” have been eviscerated. 
Not surprisingly, civil libertarians have expressed dismay about these 
developments.29 The ACLU complained that “[b]y expanding the government’s 
authority to secretly search private records and monitor communications, often 
without any evidence of wrongdoing, the Patriot Act [sic] eroded our most basic 
right—the freedom from unwarranted government introduction into our private 
lives…”30 Here, one certainly has to wonder why this would be out most basic 
right, as opposed to, say, the right to life, a right whose redemption may well 
require security and, therefore, at least some infringement on liberty. They 
acknowledge that proponents of the USA PATRIOT Act “suggest that reducing 
individual liberties during a time of increased threat to our national security is 
both reasonable and necessary,”31 but decry this reduction as a poisonous 
interpretation of our Founders’ vision. While much of their presentation is 
rhetorical, their basic idea is that liberty takes priority over security and that we 
must not capitulate on the former to promote the latter. 
This is exactly the sort of incommensurability approach that I rejected 
in § 1. On such an approach, it really does not matter how substantial the 
terrorist threat is; if we take the ACLU at its word, it is just unwilling to 
compromise on liberty despite countervailing security concerns. Surely this 
goes too far. The justification of the USA PATRIOT Act cannot hinge on 
																																								 																				
29 Whitehead & Aden, supra note 24, are concerned with Fourth Amendment violations since 
various USA PATRIOT Act provisions relax the standard of probable cause. Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence would take us too far afield for present purposes, but let me register my skepticism. 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and we can 
certainly allow that the context of terrorism lowers the requisite justification. The probable cause 
standard was promulgated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), but Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213 (1983), introduced a complementary notion of “totality of the circumstances.” 
Given my pluralistic predilections, I would transfer rigid emphasis on probable cause to a more 
permissive standard under which probable cause generally controlled, but was contextually defea-
sible. Prospective terrorist attacks would almost certainly portend such a defeating condition. 
30 ACLU, supra note 20, at 7. 
31 Id. at 8. 
 




whether it adversely affects liberties since this sets the bar far too low. Rather, 
the appropriate metric has to be whether those adverse effects are worth it, a 
calculus that the ACLU completely rejects. The commensurability approach 
that I defend queries not just adverse effects on liberties—which we can 
stipulate to exist—but also the upshot in terms of security. 
A better critique would therefore be to say that this legislation has 
adverse effects for liberty that are not offset by corresponding gains in 
security. It is very hard to think through how to analyze such a claim, 
particularly given the paucity of empirical data about how many terrorist 
threats the USA PATRIOT Act has prevented. Interestingly, the government 
claims that it has never invoked § 207, but my inclination is to think that 
liberties are compromised whether the government actually invokes the 
provision or not; the freedom against surveillance is lost regardless. 
Similarly, with § 206 and § 215, the fact that individuals could be subject to 
roving wiretaps or third-party requisition of materials inherently compro-
mises liberty, even if those powers are not exercised. 
Therefore, we should concede the loss of liberty expansively, but such 
a conceptualization is not dispositive against the legislation. Rather, it just 
calls for greater countervailing gains in terms of security; a large imposition 
against liberty can still be offset by an appropriate security gain. The issue of 
how much liberty is worth how much security still obtains, and reasonable 
people will surely disagree. But, as a conceptual matter, even the prevention 
of a single terrorist attack could justify substantial infringements against 
liberty if the costs of that attack are high enough. An accounting of those costs 
is still owed—and will be offered in § 3—but let us turn to aviation security 
in the meantime. 
 
B. Aviation Security 
 
The liberties sacrificed under the USA PATRIOT Act are largely 
unfelt and unseen; for the vast majority of Americans, this legislation has no 
material impact on our lives. To be sure, many of us take great umbrage at 
the potential invasions of their privacy, but the invasions themselves remain 
substantially unrealized. Aviation security stands diametrically opposed in 
this regard, with millions of Americans being daily subjected to its demands. 
That 9/11 was perpetuated by airplanes hardly makes it a surprise that 
aviation security has become a post-9/11 focal point. The effect is 
unmistakable, particularly via the increased burdens on travelers. 
Already explicit in the locution, aviation security seeks to secure air 
travel; it does so by restricting liberties that people would otherwise have. 
Just think of the process that it now takes to get on an airplane. We must 
remove our laptops from their carrying cases, take off belts, sweaters, jackets, 




and shoes, and then go through a metal detector, a backscatter x-ray machine, 
or a body scanner.32 The whole process is rife with foregone liberties, namely 
the liberty against boarding a plane absent any of these screening procedures. 
Of course, one has the liberty to take a pass on air travel altogether, but that 
misses the point; the liberty to participate in air travel without being subject 
to these screenings is still triaged. 
Of course, aviation security existed prior to 9/11.33 The contemporary 
version then, is not so much a sharp break from the past as the tightening of 
screws along a continuum. Some of the changes are subtle, like the removal 
of shoes. This policy owes to would-be shoe bomber Richard Reid, a British 
citizen who, just three months after 9/11, smuggled explosives onto a plane. 
The explosives had been located in his shoe, though they did not detonate, 
whether from perspiration of rainy conditions in Paris before he embarked.34 
Ever since, Americans have been forced to remove their shoes at security 
checkpoints, a practice that has drawn the ire of myriad passengers.35 
Imaging technologies are another new development at airport check-
points. Traditionally, metal detectors constituted the primary screening metric 
for passengers. However, metal detectors were unable to detect non-metallic 
bombs, and imaging technologies offer greater security in that regard. They 
																																								 																				
32 In 2013, the Transportation Security Administration introduced a new program, TSA Pre✓ 
that “allows select frequent flyers of participating airlines…to receive expedited screening 
benefits.” Sally Black, TSA Pre Check Program, VACATION KIDS, https://www.vacation 
kids.com/Vacations-with-kids/bid/320962/TSA-Pre-Check-Program. These benefits include 
“leaving on shoes, light outerwear and belts . . . [and] leaving laptops . . . in carry-on bags.” Id. 
This has had substantial benefits to those who qualify, but will not displace security protocols for 
other travelers. For more detail, see TSA PRE✓, http://www.tsa.gov/tsa-precheck. CLEAR is 
another program—currently being piloted at select airports—that accelerates security checks for 
subscribers; an annual membership is $179. How it Works, CLEAR, https://www.clearme. 
com/how-it-works. For more details, see CLEAR, http://www.clearme.com. 
33 Such aviation security existed at least for the vast majority of travelers, at least to some 
extent. As recently as 2007, I took a plane from Armidale to Sydney (Australia) and was 
astounded to find that travelers just walked on the plane without any screening. Armidale is 
predominantly a New South Wales farm town, but that just seems irrelevant, particularly 
since the plane was headed toward a crowded metropolitan center. 
34 Reid ultimately pled guilty to multiple criminal counts of terrorism and was sentenced to 
life without parole at a super maximum security (Supermax) prison in Florence, Colorado. 
He since has undertaken various hunger strikes in protest of his conditions of confinement. 
Lee Moran, Shoe Bomber in Supermax: Richard Reid Pictured for First Time Inside High 
Security Prison, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2047093/Shoe-bomber-Richard-Reid-pictured-inside-US-Supermax-jail.html.  
35 Steven Frischling, 10 Years Ago Today Airline Travelers Lost Their Shoes, BOARDING 
AREA, (Dec. 22, 2011), http://flyingwithfish.boardingarea.com/2011/12/22/10-years-ago-
today-airline-travelers-lost-their-shoes. 




effectively come in two sorts, backscatter x-ray and body scanner, the latter using 
millimeter wave technology. Due to health concerns, backscatter x-ray devices 
are being supplanted by the body scanner,36 even though the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) has downplayed risks.37 
From the outset, critics decried body imaging as an assault on privacy. 
The principal worry was that the technology revealed intimate details about 
the people it screened, that the images produced were personalized and 
represented the screened as “nearly naked.”38 Technology has mitigated 
many of these concerns, however, with software updates that produce generic 
avatars as opposed to personal renderings. Other safeguards have also been 
implemented, such as that the images taken cannot be stored or transmitted; 
they are only available for viewing and are summarily deleted thereafter.39 
Furthermore, the images are kept off-network so hackers cannot access them. 
Let us grant that the transition from backscatter to millimeter wave 
technology is a positive one for health risks and that improved software alleviates 
many privacy concerns. Still, imaging compromises liberties. No longer are 
passengers free to pass through security checkpoints un-imaged, or at least 
without submitting to additional protocols (e.g., pat-downs).40 Some would-be 
travelers even take these impositions so personally that they elect not to fly at 
all; in other words, they feel—whether reasonably or otherwise is beside the 
point—that their flying experience has been so encumbered as to be unredeem-
able.41 Imaging may have an upshot in terms of security, but that upshot is 
certainly offset by imaging’s effect on liberties. 
																																								 																				
36 Michael Grabell, TSA Removes X-Ray Body Scanners from Major Airports, PRO PUBLICA, 
(Oct. 19, 2012), https://www.propublica.org/article/tsa-removes-x-ray-body-scanners-from-
major-airports. 
37 According to the TSA, one backscatter scan produces the same radiation exposure as being 
on board a flying aircraft for two minutes. The TSA also claims that millimeter wave 
technology is said to emit thousands of times less energy than a cell phone transmission. 
Transportation Security Administration, Safety (2013), https://www.tsa.gov/blog/2012/01/ 
17/truth-about-tsa-testing-technology-radiation.  
38 John Hughes, Airport “Naked Image” Scanners May Get Privacy Upgrades, BLOOMBERG, 
(Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-08/airport-naked-image-scanners-
in-u-s-may-get-avatars-to-increase-privacy.html. 
39 Or at least so says the TSA. There might be a workaround when then machines are set to 
“test” mode. See Kim Zetter, Airport Scanners Can Store, Transmit Images, WIRED, (Jan. 
11, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/01/airport-scanners (noting that although the mach-
ines possess functions that enable them to store and send images, screeners at the airport are 
not able to put the machines into “test” mode to access those functions). 
40 One interesting advantage of the new technologies is how they are actually less invasive for 
certain demographics: those wearing metallic prosthetics would have alerted a metal detector, 
but can pass through imaging technology without being called for secondary screening. 
41 Hughes, supra note 38. 




In addition to the physical screening of carry-ons and persons, a more 
subtle sort of screening has been rolled out post-9/11. This is behavioral 
profiling, which has been a longstanding practice at Israeli airports, and is new 
at American ones; it runs under the acronym SPOT, “Screening Passengers by 
Observation Techniques.”42 There are approximately 3,000 behavioral detec-
tion officers working at 161 domestic airports, meaning that behavioral 
profiling has quickly been distributed since appropriations began in 2007.43 
Furthermore, these appropriations are already in excess of $800M, which gives 
a sense for the large scale.44 
In behavioral profiling, TSA agents ask travelers basic questions, 
ranging from general conversation to details travelers’ trips. The content of the 
answers plays a lesser role than the way in which passengers give those 
answers; agents are looking for “behaviors and appearances that deviate from 
an established baseline and that may be indicative of stress, fear, or 
deception.”45 Relevant indicators in that regard might be eye movement, 
perspiration, facial muscle movement, and so on, but operators have been 
reluctant to provide fuller details. A positive indication generates “referral 
screening,” which involves additional questioning and a physical search.46 
Criticisms of this practice abound. TSA deployed behavioral profiling 
“before first determining whether there is a scientific basis for the program.”47 
The main worry here is that SPOT officers may literally do no better than chance 
in picking out deception,48 and that false hits abound.49 Much of the scientific 
literature on this subject is inconclusive, though there are certainly grounds for 
skepticism. Still, do false positives wholly compromise the case for behavioral 
profiling? It seems to me the greater concern is that of a false negative: what 
happens when officers let through a threat? 
																																								 																				
42 Tovia Smith, Next in Line for the TSA?: A Thorough ‘Chat-Down’, NPR, (Aug. 16, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/08/16/139643652/next-in-line-for-the-tsa-a-thorough-chat-down. 
43 Sharon Weinberger, Intent to Deceive?, 465 NATURE 412 (May 27, 2010). 
44 JENNIFER A. GROVER, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-461T, TSA IS TAKING 
STEPS TO VALIDATE THE SCIENCE UNDERLYING ITS PASSENGER BEHAVIOR DETECTION 
PROGRAM, BUT EFFORTS MAY NOT BE COMPREHENSIVE, 1-2 (2011). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 3. 
48 For more discussion, see ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT (2000). See also 
Samantha Mann, et al., Detecting True Lies, 89 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 137, 137-49 (2004) 
(finding that “[p]olice officers can detect truths and lies above the level of chance and 
accuracy is related to experience with interviewing suspects.”). 
49 Weinberger tells of a traveler who was detained, ostensibly because he possessed Arabic flash 
cards and a book critical of U.S. foreign policy. Weinberger, supra note 43, at 412. It is unclear 
what behavioral cues tripped the officers, though the detainee was an innocent college student. 




This ties back to the broader discussion of the tension between liberty 
and security. In some ways, everyone who is subject to behavioral profiling has 
lost liberty, namely the liberty against being observed or questioned. Or, granting 
that these are liberties rarely retained in public settings, at least liberties from 
elevated observance and questioning are lost. The innocent person subject to a 
false positive is deprived of even more liberties, potentially including a lengthy 
delay with adverse effects on travel and beyond. But these lost liberties factor 
into a broader calculus under which a missed terrorist could do much damage. If 
the system is no better than chance, then $800M+ hardly seems justified, but TSA 
is conducting a scientific review, and more information may soon be available.50 
The broader point, though, is simply that the details will matter and that the pro-
pensity for false positives should not be dispositive against behavioral profiling. 
A final way in which aviation security threatens liberties differentially 
attaches to ethnic and religious minorities.51 Some of the differential treatment 
																																								 																				
50 Weinberger, supra note 43, at 412-13. 
51 President Trump’s proposed travel bans threaten to exacerbate these disparities. On January 27, 
2017, President Trump issued an executive order barring citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somali, 
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from entering the United States; it also suspended the United States’ 
refugee program with regards to these countries for 120 days, except Syrian refugees, who were 
suspended indefinitely. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017), revoked by 
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (March 6, 2017). A federal judge in New York 
issued an emergency injunction against this ban on January 28, 2017, which was followed by 
another temporary stay by a federal judge in Boston the following day. Darweesh v. Trump, No. 
17 Civ. 480, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017). See also U.S. Judge Bars Deportations 
under Trump Travel Ban, FOX NEWS (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/01/29/ 
us-judge-bars-deportations-under-trump-travel-ban.html (report-ing that U.S. District Judge Ann 
Donnelly’s “emergency order . . . temporarily barred the U.S. from deporting people from nations 
subject to President Donald Trump’s travel ban”); Shannon Dooling, Boston Federal Court Puts 
Hold on Trump’s Travel, Refugees Ban, WBUR (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/news/20 
17/01/29/boston-ruling-trump-executive-order (reporting the temporary restraining order issued 
by Judge Allison Burroughs and Magistrate Judge Judith Dein). On January 30, President Trump 
fired acting Attorney General Sally Yates, who refused to defend the travel ban. White House 
Statement On Firing of Acting Attorney General Sally Yates, FOX NEWS (Jan. 30, 2017), http:// 
www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/01/30/white-house-statement-on-firing-acting-attorney-general 
-sally-yates.html (reporting then-acting Attorney General Sally Yates’ firing by the White House).  
On February 1, 2017, the administration refined the travel ban to exempt permanent legal 
residents of the United States. Matthew Nussbaum, White House Tweaks Trump’s Travel Ban to 
Exempt Green Card Holders, POLITICO (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/ 
white-house-green-card-holders-no-longer-covered-by-trump-executive-order-234505 (explain-
ing that that the travel ban was reinterpreted to “exempt legal permanent residents of the United 
States”). On February 3, 2017, another federal judge in Boston declined to extend a restraining 
order against the ban, while a federal judge in Seattle temporarily blocked it again. See Judge 
Declines to Extend Trump Travel Ban Restraining Order, FOX NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www. 
foxnews.com/politics/2017/02/03/judge-declines-to-extend-trump-travel-ban-restraining-order.h 
tml (reporting that U.S. District Judge Nathaniel Gorton “refused to extend a temporary injunction 




is transparent, and some is not. Starting with the former, U.S.-bound passengers 
from fourteen countries— including Yemen, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia—face 
mandatory full-body pat-downs, extra luggage checks, and explosive detection 
																																								 																				
against President Donald Trump’s travel ban” and “declined to renew an order prohibiting the 
detention or removal of persons as part of Trump’s executive order on refugees and immigrants”); 
US Judge Temporarily Blocks Trump’s Travel Ban Nationwide, FOX NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017), http:// 
www.foxnews.com/us/2017/02/03/us-judge-temporarily-blocks-trump-travel-ban-nationwide.ht 
ml (“A U.S. judge . . . temporarily blocked President Donald Trump’s ban on people from seven 
predominantly Muslim countries after Washington state and Minnesota urged a nationwide hold 
on the executive order that has launched legal battles across the country.”).  
On February 6, 2017, the administration asked the Ninth Circuit to intervene and reverse the 
order of the Seattle judge. Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, 
Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 492504 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105). See also Justice 
Department Asks Appeals Court to Restore Trump Travel Ban, FOX NEWS (Feb. 6, 2017), http:// 
www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/02/06/justice-department-asks-appeals-court-to-restore-trump-
travel-ban.html (providing that the Department of Justice filed appeals asking the courts to restore 
the travel ban). The Ninth Circuit unanimously upheld the ban’s suspension on February 9, 2017. 
Washington v. Trump, 947 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). On February 13, 2017, a federal judge in 
Virginia granted an injunction against the administration’s implementation of the ban. Aziz v. 
Trump, 234 F.Supp.3d 724 (E.D. VA 2017).  
On March 6, 2017, President Trump reissued the travel ban with some changes, such as 
removing Iraq and exempting permanent residents and visa holders. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 
Fed. Reg. 13209 (March 6, 2017). Hawaii then sued, and a federal judge granted its request for a 
temporary restraining order. Hawaii v. Trump, 233 F.Supp.3d 850 (D. Haw. 2017). This order 
was extended two weeks later, and the administration again petitioned the Ninth Circuit for relief. 
Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F.Sipp.3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017). Months later, on May 25, 2017, the Fourth 
Circuit again blocked the ban. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 
2017). However, the Supreme Court allowed for the travel ban to be implemented on June 26, 
2017, albeit in a more limited version. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S.Ct. 2080 
(2017). For example, the Court provided that “§ 2(c) [of the Executive Order, or EO-2] may not 
be enforced against foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with 
a person or entity in the United States. [However], all other foreign nationals are subject o the 
provision of EO-2.” Id. at 2089. See also Melanie Zanona, White House Outlines Who Can Travel 
under Trump’s Ban, THE HILL (June 29, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/340 
095-white-house-outlines-who-can-travel-under-trumps-ban (reporting on the White House’s 
guidance that was issued in response to the Supreme Court’s decision). On September 7, 2017, 
the Ninth Circuit expanded the interpretation of “bona fide relationship” to include more family 
members, such as grandparents, in-laws, aunts and uncles, nephews and nieces, and cousins. State 
v. Trump, 971 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017). 
A third version of the travel ban came out on September 24, 2017, including citizens of Chad, 
Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, as well as some government officials from 
Venezuela. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017). In December 2017, the 
Supreme Court issued two stay orders. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 542 (2017). On January 19, 
2018, the Supreme Court announced it would hear oral argument in April and issue a final ruling 
by June. Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court To Hear Case Over Trump’s Revised Travel Ban, 
POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/01/19/supreme-court-announ 
ces-it-will-rule-on-trumps-travel-ban.html.  




sweeps. These added measures apply if those passengers hold passports from the 
listed countries—or are embarking within them— and destined for the U.S. 
Some of the countries are designated by the U.S. as state sponsors of terrorism, 
whereas others are designated as “countries of interest.”52 While the civil rights 
and Muslim anti-discrimination groups have decried this practice as tantamount 
to racial discrimination, the U.S. has tied it to security. 
While this constitutes U.S. official policy, abuse of discretion portends 
another way in which minorities may face added scrutiny. Screeners at Newark 
Liberty Airport were charged with racially profiling Mexican and Dominican 
passengers;53 four of these screeners were ultimately fired, and dozens more 
suspended.54 Mexican travelers were also allegedly targeted for secondary 
screening at Honolulu International Airport.55 Sikhs have long complained of 
profiling, and a thorny issue herein emerges given their religious use of turbans 
and the associated security issues that such headwear raises.56 Since secondary 
screening is often discretionary, it is simply hard to know if minorities subjected 
to that screening are subjected under good faith or are differentially targeted 
given their minority status. And this issue gets even trickier when considering 
that differential targeting could result from unconscious or implicit bias, not 
necessarily from screeners’ willful misconduct. 
Differential targeting raises a whole host of concerns. While more 
universally-applied measures infringe greater amounts of liberty overall, at least 
they do so without prejudice. But, in terms of the calculus between liberty and 
security, where is the upshot? Prejudicial enforcement infringes less liberty than 
ubiquitous enforcement (i.e., by enforcing against fewer people), which is a 
prima facie good. To take an example, the U.S. could solve the differential 
enforcement against citizens or passengers from the fourteen listed countries by 
subjugating all passengers to elevated screenings. This might appease our moral 
outrage, but does that make it good policy? 
																																								 																				
52 Peter Grier, US-Bound Passengers from 14 Countries Face New Airport Security, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, (Jan. 10, 2010), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/ 
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53 Steve Strunsky, Report: Newark Airport Screeners Targeted Mexicans, THE STAR-LEDGER, (June 
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55 Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, TSA Investigates Profiling Allegations at Honolulu Airport, 
CNSNEWS.COM, (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/tsa-investigates-ho 
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Traveler, THE SIKH COALITION: THE VOICE OF A PEOPLE (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.sikh 
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For the sake of argument, let us stipulate that passengers from those 
countries, in the aggregate, portend greater security risks than other demo-
graphics. The U.S. then has three options: elevated screenings for those 
passengers, for all passengers, or for no passengers. On my approach, target-
ing all passengers may burden too many liberties, and targeting no passengers 
may irresponsibly transgress against security concerns. Of course, the 
empirical presupposition could well be false, in which case the argument 
collapses; obviously it would only make more sense to differentially target if 
the targeted group were more likely to carry security risks. The targeting of 
Mexicans in Newark and Honolulu almost certainly fails this metric, and is 
therefore illicit. But differential targeting should not be precluded full stop, 
so long as the appropriate evidentiary basis is supplied. 
With both the USA PATRIOT Act and aviation security, critics allege 
that the infringements on liberty are intolerable, whether because liberties are 
sacrosanct57 or just because these are the costs are too high for the benefits they 
produce.58 While I find the first line of thinking radically implausible, the second 
is certainly on the table; nothing thus far has contended otherwise. But in order 
to assess its viability, we need a better conception of what hangs in the balance. 
Certainly our liberties are important. My contention, though, is that our security 
is undervalued, particularly by civil libertarians. Were a weightier account of 
how to value security on offer, it could substantiate greater restrictions on liberty. 
In the next section, I will attempt to develop such an account, particularly in the 
context of terrorism and counterterrorism. 
 
III. WHY SECURITY MATTERS 
 
In order to understand whether security is worth the costs, we need to 
know both what security costs and what it prevents. If the costs of security are 
higher—whether economically or non-economically—than those incurred by 
its absence, security’s costs are not justified.59 The preceding section explored 
some of the costs of security in terms of liberty, but herein I propose that we 
take a broader approach. In other words, security costs not just liberty; it has 
other economic and non-economic costs as well. If security is to be justified, it 
must be justified against the totality of its costs, which is just to say that security 
																																								 																				
57 See generally ACLU, supra note 20. 
58 Charles C. Mann, Smoke Screening, VANITY FAIR, (Dec. 20, 2011), https://www.vanity 
fair.com/culture/2011/12/tsa-insanity-201112.  
59 In case this is not obvious, consider an agricultural example. Some hypothetical blight threatens 
crops; it would cost $2M to eradicate the blight, but the crops are only worth $1M. The crops 
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is more expensive than just its adverse effects on liberty. In the first part of this 
section, I will paint a fuller conception of these costs, focusing on terrorism 
and counterterrorism; roughly speaking, terrorism is the cost of security’s 
absence and (effective) counterterrorism is the cost of security.60 In the second 
part of this section, I will consider the complementary question of what costs 
security redeems, or, to put it another way, the costs that a lack of security 
would incur. The goal will be to characterize the absence of—or lessened—
security as quite expensive indeed, thus meaning that high costs of security are 
more likely to be justified.61 
Starting with the costs of terrorism, let us consider 9/11 as a dramatic 
example. Following the work of Robert Looney, we might say that costs 
either can be direct or indirect, as well as immediate, short-, mid-, or long-
term.62 Immediate and short-term direct impacts, for example, were that 
200,000 jobs in New York were destroyed or re-located out of New York, at 
least temporarily. Destruction of physical assets was valued at over $16B; 
rescue, clean-up, and related costs have been estimated at approximately 
$11B. Immediate and short-term indirect costs included a slowing of 
economic activity, with original projections putting the cost at as high as 
$500B; the actual cost probably fell short of this. 
In the mid- and long-term, the costs become indirect but still 
substantial. Mid-term indirect costs include those to the insurance industry 
($30B-$58B), airlines (tens of thousands of jobs and an overall devaluing of 
the industry), tourism and other service industries (tens of thousands of jobs 
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62 Robert Looney, Economic Costs to the United States Stemming from the 9/11 Attacks, 
STRATEGIC INSIGHTS (Aug. 2002), https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/25404/ 
Economic_Costs_to_the_United_States_Stemming_From_the_911_Attacks.pdf?sequence=1. 
See also Howard Kunreuther, et al., Assessing, Managing, and Financing Extreme Events: 
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which is why the estimate that I develop is significantly higher. 
Another scholar assessed the global economic impact of “transnational terrorism”—as 
well as the cost-effectiveness of our responses to it. TODD SANDLER, et al., Transnational 
Terrorism, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, 516-562 (Bjørn Lomberg, ed., 2009). 
For a response, see S. BROCK BLOMBERG, The Copenhagen Consensus: Perspective Paper 
on Transnational Terrorism Policies, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, 563-576 
(Bjørn Lomberg, ed., 2009) and WALTER ENDERS & TODD SANDLER, THE POLITICAL 
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and lowered equity value for hotels and other facilities), increased military 
spending ($80B+), and so on. Long-term indirect costs include higher 
operating costs (e.g., increased security), higher risk premiums (e.g., from 
lenders to borrowers), shifting of resources from civilian to military forces, 
shifting away from globalization, and so on.63 Putting dollar amounts on the 
long-term costs is difficult, and even assessing the mid-term costs can be 
challenging. Nevertheless, we might reasonably assess the economic costs of 
9/11 to be somewhere in the vicinity of $500B-$1T.64 
Included in these costs are the damages of the attacks—both direct 
and indirect—as well as the counterterrorism measures that they spawned. 
These can be usefully separated insofar as such a separation helps us get clear 
on what we are spending to protect against something else. For fiscal year 
(FY) 2003, additional spending of $48B was proposed for national defense, 
as well as $38B more for homeland security.65 The defense budget has 
continued to rise since 9/11—with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan playing a 
significant role—and certainly some of this can reasonably be said to go to 
counterterrorism. 
But the best focus is probably on the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), which was largely created to defend against terrorism.66 This 
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not? Assuming that the answer is no, then the price tag for that war gets added as an indirect 
cost of 9/11, and that price tag is huge. Original estimates were ludicrously low—some as 
low as $2B—with even the more “conservative” ones coming in at $100B-$200B. The actual 
cost will be at least ten times that, and potentially as high as $3T. Linda J. Blimes & Joseph 
E. Stiglitz, The Iraq War Will Cost Us $3 Trillion, and Much More, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 
2008, B01. 
Nevertheless, there is something misleading about adding its costs to the 9/11 ledger, 
especially if that ledger is meant to indicate the costs of terrorism: the Bush Administration 
did not have to pursue Operation Iraqi Freedom and, regardless, its costs are more appro-
priately assigned to counterterrorism than to terrorism. (This is not to say that such costs can 
be neatly assigned to either). I only raise this issue briefly because the Iraq war is an elephant 
in the room as pertains to the consequences of 9/11; for the discussion that follows, nothing 
substantive hangs on whether we count it as a cost thereof or not. 
Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) also tallies a significant expense, though 
probably only about 10% that of Operation Iraqi Freedom; estimates for the military efforts 
in Afghanistan are just under $200B from 2001-2009. AMY BELASCO, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL33110, THE COST OF IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11 2 (2008.) 
65 Looney, supra note 62, at 2-3. 
66 Its strategic plan, for example, says that the Department “was created to secure our country 
against those who seek to disrupt the American way of life,” though it makes the further 
provision that “our charter also includes preparation for and response to all hazards and 
disasters.” One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland: U.S. Department of Homeland 




Department serves other functions as well (e.g., security against illegal 
immigration), but terrorism is a principal focus. A detailed analysis has been 
carried out elsewhere,67 but some key results are worth noting. For example, 
the cost of homeland security spending increased from $56B I n 2001 to 
$99.5B in 2005. The federal outlays, which are easier to track the money 
coming from other sources, are somewhere around half of the total in 2005 
($53.4B), which represents 0.4% of the gross domestic product (GDP); this 
represents a doubling since 2001 (0.2%) and a four-fold increase from the 
period 1996-2001 (0.1%).68 
Of the FY 2005 spending, approximately 8% went directly to 
domestic counterterrorism, though much of the rest of the budget funds 
related areas: protecting critical infrastructure and key assets (34%); 
defending against catastrophic threats (15%); emergency preparedness and 
response (11%); and intelligence and warning (1%). Only border and 
transportation security (31%) is not majorly tied to counterterrorism, but 
rather reflects the absorption of Immigration and Naturalization Services by 
the DHS in 2003. Still, even this spending is relevant to counterterrorism 
insofar as it funds our ability to keep terrorists out of the country in the first 
place. Given this data, let us therefore conclude that, from 2001-2005, the US 
was spending somewhere around $50B-$100B/year on counter-terrorism, not 
including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.69 As the range clearly indicates, 
this estimate is not meant to be precise, but rather aims to give us some broad 
sense—at least within an order of magnitude—on what counterterrorism 
costs us. And therein lies the question: is it worth it? 
Some people clearly think not. For example, Jessica Wolfendale 
argues that “we should fear counterterrorism more than we fear terrorism.”70 
Her argument has two prongs: first, she argues that the risk of terrorism 
simply is not that great and, second, that the costs of our counterterrorism 
measures are higher than we think. On her thinking, once we adequately 
																																								 																				
Security Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008-2013, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 1, 2 (2008), 
https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Domestic-Security/Documents/DHSStrategicPlan2008-2013.aspx. 
Elsewhere, it continues: “We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and 
respond to threats and hazards to the Nation. We will secure our national borders while 
welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade.” Id. at 3. 
67 Bart Hobijn & Erick Sager, What Has Homeland Security Cost? An Assessment: 2001-
2005, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 13 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
2, 1-7 (2007).  
68 Id. at 1-2. 
69 Again, for a more rigorous economic analysis of the worldwide costs of terrorism see 
SANDLER, supra note 62 and Blomberg, supra note 62. 
70 Jessica Wolfendale, Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism, 30 STUD. IN 
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 75, 75-92 (2007). 




understand the (lesser) costs of terrorism and the (higher) costs of counter-
terrorism, we will see that the latter are not justified; they just do not provide 
a positive return. She takes issue with the hubris of, for example, President 
George W. Bush and Colin Powell, who have said, respectively, that ter-
rorism threatens not only our lives but also “our way of life” and our 
“civilization.”71 But does it? Consider: 
 
On average only 420 people are killed and another 1249 are 
injured each year from transnational terrorist attacks. 
Nevertheless, the public in rich countries views transnational 
terrorism as one of the greatest threats. This is rather ironic 
since over 30,000 people die on US highways annually, yet 
highway safety is not as much of a public concern.72 
 
Or, more viscerally: 
 
. . . the estimated 1,000-7,000 yearly deaths from terrorism 
pales in to insignificance next to the 40,000 people who die 
every day from hunger, the 500,000 people who are killed 
every year by light weapons and the millions who die annually 
from diseases like influenza (3.9 million annual deaths), HIV-
AIDS (2.9 million annual deaths), diarrhoeal (2.1 million 




Since 2001, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria, funded by all willing governments and devoted to 
combating diseases that kill about 6 million people each year, 
has committed about $6.9 billion and spent about $4.4 billion. 
This expenditure comes to roughly $120 per fatality. Between 
2001 and 2006, the US Government alone has spent $438 
billion on the war on terror. This amount comes to roughly 
$146 million per US fatality—over a million times more per 
fatality.74 
																																								 																				
71 Id. (quoting RICHARD JACKSON, WRITING THE WAR ON TERROR: LANGUAGE, POLITICS, 
AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 99 (Manchester University Press, 2005)). 
72 SANDLER, supra note 62. 
73 Wolfendale, supra note 70, at 77 (citation omitted) (quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
74 Thomas Pogge, Making War on Terrorists—Reflections on Harming the Innocent, 16 J. 
OF POL. PHIL. 1, 1-2 (2008). See also Belasco, supra note 65. Note that Belasco’s sum does 




These statistics are meant to show that terrorism poses less of a threat than 
we think it does, or at least that the threat from terrorism pales in comparison 
to various other threats that we seem to care a lot less about. How then can 
our substantial response to terrorism be justified? 
The answer to this question depends on what terrorism threatens. The 
statistics are, most directly, about the number of lives that stand to be lost, 
whether through terrorism, highway safety, hunger, war, or disease. But 
certainly terrorism threatens more than just lives; we should not merely 
observe that terrorism comes up short on the “ledger of lives” and thereafter 
deprioritize our response to it. As indicated above, the economic costs of 9/11 
are staggering, way more than the 30,000 lives lost to highway accidents. 
Economic costs are one sort of value and lives are another; even if you think, 
as actuaries might, that these latter values can be rendered economically, this 
picture is still radically incomplete.75 
In particular, it fails to appreciate other critical costs of terrorism: its 
symbolic costs. A few thousand people died on 9/11, and the economic impact 
of that day was catastrophic. Lives and dollars aside, though, that day cost us 
much more that those numbers could express. The terrorists destroyed the 
World Trade Center, a central icon of our economic strength. They crashed 
into the Pentagon, a building that represents our military strength. And, were it 
not for the brave passengers who helped crash United 93 in rural Pennsylvania, 
a plane probably would have hit either the White House or the Capitol, 
buildings that embody the strength of our government. These symbolic attacks 
against our economy, military, and government were chosen precisely because 
of that symbolism; as many or more lives—and perhaps similar economic 
damages—could have as easily been exacted through other targets. 
While many Americans are personally unaffected by the tragedy of 
30,000 annual highway deaths, few of us could say the same of 9/11. It adversely 
affected our collective sense of safety. It took away our sense of place in the 
world. It left us vulnerable at the individual, institutional, and national levels. 
Even a cynic who belabors the failings of American culture, our inappropriate 
smugness, our inappropriate relationship with the rest of the world, or our 
arrogance must nevertheless acknowledge that our collective suffering, even if 
																																								 																				
not include all the costs of 9/11, but only money that Congress has approved “for military 
operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health 
care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), 
providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).” Belasco, 
supra note 64, at 2. In other words, Belasco provides only a partial accounting of our 
counterterrorism spending. 
75 And Wolfendale agrees. Wolfendale, supra note 70, at 80-2. 




ill-founded, is a substantial harm. And, again, this is not to deny that we should 
care more about, for example, pharmaceuticals in the developing world, or even 
that we have a moral obligation to support poor countries. Rather, the point is 
simply that terrorism takes more than lives and dollars. 
Nevertheless, there is a hazard in developing an account of terrorism 
or counterterrorism that depends too strongly on 9/11: this is, at least in terms 
of lives and excluding military bombings during war, perhaps the most spec-
tacular single-day terrorist attack ever.76 We must be careful not to exaggerate 
																																								 																				
76 Other significant transnational terror attacks include:  
 
 Date  Event  Perpetrator  Deaths 
 July 22, 1946  Bombing of local British military head- 
 quarters at King David Hotel, Jerusalem 
 Irgun Zai Leumi  91 
 August 2, 1980  Bombing of Bologna railway station  Armed Revolutionary   
 Nuclei 
 84 
 October 23, 1983  Suicide truck bombing of US  
 Marines' barracks, Beirut 
 Hezbollah  241 
 June 23, 1985  Downing of Air India 182, en route  
 from Montreal to London 
 Sikh extremists  329 
 December 21, 1988  Downing of Pan Am 103, en route   
 from London to New York 
 Libyan intelligence   
 agent 
 270 
 September 19,1989  Downing of Union des Transports  
 772, en route from Brazzaville  
 (Republic of the Congo) to Paris 
 Hezbollah  171 
 March 12, 1993  Thirteen bombings in Bombay  Pakistani agents  317 
 August 7, 1998  Simultaneous bombings of US  
 embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and  
 Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
 Al-Qaeda  223 
 September 11, 2001  Four suicide hijackings that crashed  
 into the World Trade Center, the  
 Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania 
. 
 Al-Qaeda  2,974  
 (plus 19  
 hijackers) 
 October 12, 2002  Two bombs outside Bali nightclubs  Jemaah Islamiyah  202 
 March 11, 2004  Bombing of Madrid commuter  
 trains and stations during morning 
rush hour 
 Al-Qaida  190 
 September 1, 2004  Barricade hostage seizure of school  
 children and parents in Belan,  
 North Ossetia-Alania (Russia) 
 Chechen rebels  344 
. 
ALLHOFF, supra note 61, at 33 n.40 (adapted from SANDLER, supra note 62). See also Chris 
Quillen, A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers, 25.5 STUD. IN CONFLICT & 
TERRORISM 279, 279-92 (2002) (providing data from which this chart was adapted); Chris 
Quillen, Mass Casualty Bombings Chronology, 25.5 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 293, 
293-302 (2002)) (same). 




the (ongoing) risks of terrorism by appeal to a singular event and one that will 
probably not recur, regardless of our counterterrorism strategies. Or, to put it 
another way, how likely is it that our investment in counterterrorism since 
9/11 prevented anything like it from happening since? Or even some 
constellation of attacks that would collectively approximate 9/11's damage? 
This is a hard question, and the associative counter-factual reasoning—i.e., 
what would have happened had we not done such and so—is perilous.77 
Nevertheless, at least a few substantive points can be made. 
First, 9/11 was so bad that any individual or constellation of attacks 
even an order of magnitude off from it would still be heinous. If, for example, 
our counterterrorism has prevented an aggregated 10% of 9/11's losses, this 
is very substantial. Second, there were semi-regular terrorist attacks against 
the U.S. over the two decades preceding 9/11. Marines’ barracks in Beirut 
were targeted by two truck bombs (1983); two-thirds of the victims of Pan 
Am 103 were American (1988); two U.S. embassies were bombed (1998); and 
then came 9/11 (2001).78 The bombings of the Federal building in Oklahoma 
City killed 168 people (1995), though this attack was different in the sense 
that it was domestic—as opposed to transnational—terrorism; regardless, the 
effects were as real. All told, this is five serious attacks from 1983-2001. In 
fact, there was not a single successful attack between 9/11 and the Boston 
																																								 																				
Note that the bombings in Jerusalem (1946) and Beirut (1983) were against 
military installations, so it is questionable whether these bombings should 
count as terroristic. The American soldiers in Beirut were mostly Marines, 
ostensibly there on a peacekeeping mission; some Lebanese Muslims in-
stead saw them as a faction in the ongoing civil war. Whether peacekeeping 
or humanitarian forces are properly understood as noncombatant lies outside 
the scope of this project, but an argument in the affirmative can certainly be 
made. The bombing of Jerusalem's King David Hotel was carried out by the 
Irgun, an underground Zionist organization that was responding to British 
action under Operation Agatha (or “Black Saturday”); the British coor-
dinated searches and arrests in various Jewish cities and settlements, as well 
at the Jewish Agency (i.e., the pre-state Jewish government). While the 
British forces were headquartered in the hotel, so were various other admin-
istrative and government contingents. At least some of the casualties were 
therefore noncombatants, though some were clearly military command. In 
either case, determinations as to whether the bombings were terroristic does 
not matter for present purposes, but provocative issues are raised in both.  
 
ALLHOFF, supra note 61, at 33 n.40.  
77 For discussion of a sophisticated attempt, see SANDLER, supra note 62. 
78 It is worth acknowledging that, while these four attacks were primarily against Americans, 
three of them took place abroad. How effective would our counterterrorism campaign—esp-
ecially under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security—been in preventing them? 




Marathon bombings;79 this was the longest period of safety that we had 
enjoyed in thirty years.80 The paucity of successful attacks since the prolifer-
ation of our powerful counterterrorism campaign can hardly be a coincidence. 
So let us now assume that our counterterrorism campaign has worked, 
without committing ourselves to any substantive view about whether it is 
optimal; surely nothing in the real world is. This then brings us to the second 
of Wolfendale's concerns, which is that the costs of counterterrorism, even if 
successful, are nevertheless high. And these costs are not just the economic 
ones previously discussed, which we might charitably assume are reasonably 
justified. Rather, there are all sorts of other potential costs, such as the hazards 
pertaining to the sort of people and nation that we have become in responding 
to terrorism.81 As discussed in § 2, we have restricted liberties, of which the 
USA PATRIOT Act and aviation security are only the most visible examples. 
This is at least prima facie bad, no doubt. But the central question is whether 
such harms—whether against liberty and more generally (e.g., catalyzing of 
anti-American sentiment, inchoate terrorist threats, etc.)—can be justified 
given countervailing benefits. 
 
IV. BALANCING LIBERTY AND SECURITY 
 
In § 1, the tension between liberty and security was adjudicated by 
conceiving of them as commensurable and then seeking to balance their 
competing interests against each other. Roughly speaking, if a small infrin-
gement on liberty were worth a large gain in security, that infringement could 
be justified. Conversely, a large infringement on liberty that only provided a 
small benefit to security would not be justified. Of course, different people 
																																								 																				
79 While discussion of the Boston Marathon bombings would take me too far afield, there 
are various ways in which this attack is particularly worrisome from a security perspective. 
If the Tsarnaev brothers acted independently, their bombings might portend a new era of 
grass-roots and low-tech terrorism (e.g., garage-made bombs). There are various ways in 
which this sort of terrorism is harder to combat than terrorism perpetuated by broader 
networks, the most obvious being simply knowing who the adversary is. A multiplicity of 
de-centralized adversaries makes surveillance much harder, including acquisition of inform-
ants, monitoring of financials, and so on. 
80 The Fort Hood shootings are one potential exception. However, I doubt that the shooter, 
Dr. Nidal Malik Hasan, was acting on any ideological grounds and was instead just disturbed 
about his pending deployment to Afghanistan. Absent ideological aims, I would not classify 
this act as terroristic. For more discussion, see ALLHOFF, supra note 62, at §1.5. 
81 A particular concern in this regard is the loss of innocent life effected by counterterrorist 
operations. See, e.g., Jane Meyer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the C.I.A.’s 
Covert Drone Program?, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer?printable=true. 




would reasonably disagree about the relative weights to assign to these 
infringements and benefits. Therefore, the political process is tasked with 
aggregating the values of its polity and rendering an outcome (i.e., counting 
up the chips and seeing which side has more).82 They key to this approach is 
that benefits to security must be balanced against losses to liberty; the trick is 
attaching values to each—though note the heuristic model suggested in § 1—
not in what knowing to do with those values once they are discerned. 
Such an approach has been criticized, and, in this last section of the 
paper, some engagement with those criticisms is owed. Most generally, the 
disagreement comes from rights theorists. Their move is to say that liberties 
stand outside a broader calculus under which those liberties can be traded for 
other social goods. Rather, it is inherent in the very nature of liberties that 
they are trumps83 (or side constraints)84 against competing social goods. In 
other words, liberties inevitably win out in a conflict because of what liberties 
are; to hold otherwise substantially misunderstands their very nature.85 
For example, imagine some restaurant with a racist clientele. And 
further imagine that the racist proclivities of this clientele pit the economic 
prospects of the restaurant against the accommodation of minorities; at most, 
one of these values can be realized.86 At least for many, no balancing test is 
due the economic interests against the anti-discrimination interests. Rather, 
the anti-discrimination interests trump—and are therefore incommensurable 
with—the economic interests. If this analysis sounds right here, what 
distinguishes the security context?87  
																																								 																				
82 For a skeptical view, see generally Mark Neocleous, Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance: 
Towards a Critique of Security Politics, 6 CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY 131 (2007). 
83 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, xi (Harvard University Press, 1977). 
84 Nozick, supra note 5, at 28-33. 
85 Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. OF POL. PHIL. 196 
(2003). For more discussion, see Kleinig, supra note 1, at 372-373; STANLEY I. BENN, A 
THEORY OF FREEDOM (Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
86 For somewhat similar fact pattern, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) 
(holding that that Civil Rights Act of 1964 could be upheld under Congress’s commerce 
power). Our discussion, however, is more broadly normative than legal. 
87 Waldron uses a somewhat different example to make the same point. He imagines having 
made a promise to meet with a student, then being invited by a friend to lunch. Waldron, supra 
note 85, at 195-96. According to Waldron, how delicious the lunch would be is irrelevant to 
whether the promise to the student can be broken. Id. Per below, I disagree with this analysis; 
the promise is kept because its value almost always outweighs the value of (even a really 
delicious) lunch, not because promises are lexically prior to lunches. On my view, were 
Waldron to be whisked from his office at NYU up to midtown for lunch at Per Se, he might be 
justified in breaking a casual commitment (i.e., if lunch mattered a lot and the promise did not), 
a possibility that his analysis forecloses. See also JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS AND 
NORMS 37 (1999) (siding with Waldron). 




First, the conclusion of the analysis can still be accommodated under a 
balancing approach, which would be my preference. On this approach, the 
economic interests of the restaurant pale in comparison to anti-discrimination, 
so the restaurant gets forcibly integrated against its owner’s wishes.88 Second—
as we saw in § 3—security portends far deeper values than mere economic ones. 
So, even if the economic values lose to liberties here, it does not follow that 
liberties always win (i.e., as against weightier values). Robert Nozick famously 
championed the priority of rights, but was far more agnostic about their 
preeminence in cases of “catastrophic moral horror,”89 which are exactly the 
cases that terrorism threatens. Being able to accommodate other important 
values does not diminish the value of liberties. Rather, it only recognizes that, 
at least in some contexts, other values reach their maximal expression. 
More specifically, Jeremy Waldron finds the balancing approach to 
liberty and security wanting, particularly if it entails a commitment that, post 
9/11, those “who care about civil liberties need to realign balances between 
security and freedom.”90 This thinking implies that we learned something on 
9/11 that we did not know on 9/10, namely that greater value is due our security 
than we previously thought, and that value is to be redeemed at the expense of 
our liberties.91 Waldron finds this realignment problematic for four reasons. 
First, as above, he is skeptical of a calculus that integrates liberty and security. 
Second, he worries as to how the burdens on liberties are distributed; a harm may 
arise if those burdens are differentially absorbed.92 Third, he says that restrictions 
																																								 																				
88 Of course, we can develop hypotheticals to make this a closer case. Suppose a racist, wealthy 
patron offers a $1M catering contract on the sole condition that the owner excludes some 
particular minority client from the event. Furthermore, suppose the owner is $1M in debt and 
faces imminent foreclosure; the catering contract—and its Faustian bargain—is the only 
opportunity to evade bankruptcy. Furthermore, the anti-discrimination context can be broader 
than just race-based discrimination. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Com’n. 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2016). In this case, 
Jack Phillips, the proprietor of a Christian bakery, has refused to make cakes for gay weddings. 
After losing subsequent litigation, Phillips no longer makes cakes for any weddings and has 
claimed financial hardship as a result. Of course this case introduces another axis (viz., religious 
liberty) beyond the two already mentioned here (viz., economic interests and anti-discrimination). 
89 Nozick, supra note 5, at 30. 
90 Waldron, supra note 85, at 192 (quoting Nicholas Kristof, Liberal Reality Check: We Must 
Look Anew at Freedom vs. Security, PITTSBURGH-POST GAZETTE (June 2, 2002) at A09). 
91 Waldron, supra note 85, at 192-93. Kleinig argues that the problem prior to 9/11 was not a lack 
of balance between liberty and security, but rather the lack of functionality of extant security 
mechanisms. Kleinig, supra note 1. In other words, security need not come at the expense of liberty, 
but rather can be improved independently. Surely this is correct, and I agree that we should not 
burden liberty if gains to security can otherwise be realized. However, the present focus is on when 
the tension between the two is irreconcilable and one can only be had at the expense of the other. 
92 See also Kleing, supra note 1, at 374. 




on liberties may have unintended effects, including adverse effects on security. 
And, fourth, he cautions that symbolic—as opposed to substantive—conse-
quences for security are inadequate to license infringements on liberty.93 
Having already commented on the first concern, let me briefly comment 
on the second and third before spending more time on the fourth. With regards 
to the second, of course the distribution of burdens matters; this issue arose in § 
2.2 with regards to aviation security (cf., differential treatment of ethnic and 
religious minorities), and I was sympathetic. However, this consideration can 
easily be accounted for in the balancing approach: distributive inequities are 
costly. Recall that my balancing approach is pluralistic, countenancing both 
economic and non-economic costs; these inequities carry (at least) a moral cost 
and that counts against them. If the facts on the ground came out a certain way, 
maybe this cost could be sustained as against greater benefits, but that hardly 
carries us down the road to Korematsu.94 
With regards to the third, the unintended and adverse effects of 
security matter, but so do the unintended and adverse effects of liberty; one 
only has to think of the travesties in Aurora and Newtown to see liberty gone 
awry.95 Waldron considers just one side of the coin in this regard, which ends 
up skewing his results. In other words, granting Waldron’s point that 
unintended effects complicate the balancing approach, such complications 
can be marshaled against liberty as well as in its favor. Furthermore, there is 
no principled reason to think that liberty should be asymmetrically privileged 
as against security in this regard. Overall, though, there need not be any 
particular disagreement between Waldron and me on these two issues; maybe 
we tally things up differently, but we can otherwise agree. 
With regards to his fourth concern, the disagreement is more sub-
stantial. His condescension for the public is palpable: 
 
[In response to terrorist attacks,] people want to feel that some-
thing is being done….People are less interested in the effective-
ness of these [responses] than in the sense that something striking 
																																								 																				
93 Waldron, supra note 85, at 194-95. 
94 See Kleing, supra note 1.  
95See, e.g., Jennifer Brown, 12 Shot Dead, 58 Wounded in Aurora Movie Theater during Batman 
Premier, DENVER POST, (July 20, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_21124893/12-
shot-dead-58-wounded-aurora-movie-theater (discussing the mass shooting in Aurora, CO). See 
also James Barron, Children Were All Shot Multiple Times with a Semiautomatic, Officials Say, 
N.Y TIMES, (Dec. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/nyregion/gunman-kills-20-
children-at-school-in-connecticut-28-dead-in-all.html (discussing the mass shooting in Sandy 
Hook); Michael Waldman, The Second Amendment: A Biography (2004) (discussing contemp-
orary gun violence, including the mass shootings in Aurora, CO and Sandy Hook, CT). 




and unusual is being done. No doubt the psychological reassur-
ance that people derive from this is a consequential gain from the 
loss of liberty. But whether it is the sort of gain that should count 
morally is another question.96 
 
For one, Waldron makes an empirical claim with no apparent empirical basis, 
namely that people are more interested that something be done in response to 
terrorism than that it be effective. Why think this is true? Of course people want 
there to be a response to terrorism, but, for all Waldron says, they could be 
completely indifferent as to whether that response was effective or not; its mere 
existence placates. This has to be a non-starter since indifference between an 
ineffective response and an effective one is not even psychologically viable. 
More substantively, he wonders whether psychological assurance 
constitutes a moral gain. So imagine here that people somehow feel safer from 
a terrorist threat, but that, in reality, they are not. It is hard to know what sort 
of facts could vindicate this premise; in general, the two would track together. 
But, for the sake of argument, suppose that liberties are restricted, people feel 
safer, and yet they are not. Apparently, the balancing test gets this wrong and 
justifies the restriction on liberties. But why? What is being balanced is liberty 
and security; if there is no security, then the liberties should not be restricted. 
Or so goes one reply to Waldron. My preference is to be more ambitious 
and to allow that psychological reassurance counts toward the value of security. 
Security therefore has two components, both objective and subjective. And it 
finds its maximal expression when people are safe, and believe themselves to 
be. From this maximal expression, it would be worse if either they were less safe, 
or if they believed they were. It is therefore indeterminate which is better: (1) 
people who are not safe, but believe they are; or (2) people who are safe, but 
believe they are not. Since security—whether objectively or subjectively—is 
more appropriately measured on a spectrum than bivalently, we can imagine 
myriad interplays between these two dimensions. In any case, I reject Waldron’s 
dubiousness than psychological reassurance matters. 
All told, even Waldron concedes that his arguments are not dispositive 
against a balancing approach, only that such an approach merits “care and 
caution” moving forward.97 With this, I agree. Restrictions on liberty should not 
be taken lightly, whether for the sake of security or otherwise. Liberties matter, 
as do the distributions and unintended effects of their curtailment. When we 
restrict liberties, we should do so only for good reason. Waldron and I might 
disagree as to what those reasons are—e.g., whether subjective security counts—
but there need not be any disagreement on the broader methodology. 
																																								 																				
96 Waldron, supra note 85, at 209 (emphasis in original). 
97 Id. 
